

Super Returns to Super Bowl Ads?*

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Abstract

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This paper uses a natural experiment—the Super Bowl—to study the causal effect of advertising on demand for movies. Identification of the causal effect rests on two points: 1) Super Bowl ads are purchased before advertisers know which teams will play; 2) home cities of the teams that are playing will have proportionally more viewers than viewers in other cities. We find that the movies in our sample experience on average incremental opening weekend ticket sales of about \$8.4 million from a \$3 million Super Bowl advertisement.

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1 Introduction

The United States spends roughly 2 percent of its GDP on advertising (Galbi [2008]). Not surprisingly, whether, when, and why advertising increases product demand is of considerable interest to economists and marketers. However, empirically measuring the impact of advertising is notoriously difficult. Products that are heavily advertised tend to sell more, but this in itself does not prove causation (Sherman and Tollison [1971], Comanor and Wilson [1971]). A particular product often sees an increase in sales after increasing its ad expenditures, but here too the causation could run the other way (Heyse and Wei [1985], Ackerberg [2003]). For example, flower companies increase ad expenditures in the weeks leading up to Valentine’s Day and see increased sales around Valentine’s Day. But it is not easy to determine the causal impact of that ad expenditure since many of the same factors that affect consumer demand may also affect advertising purchase decisions (Schmalensee [1978], Lee et al. [1996]).

Testing for causal effects requires an exogenous shock to ad exposures. The gold standard, as usual, is a randomized experiment. For this reason, field experiments have become increasingly popular among economists and marketers studying advertising (Simester et al. [2009], Bertrand et al. [2010], Lewis and Rao [2012]). However, these experiments tend to be expensive and require access to proprietary data. Moreover, they tend to have low power, often do not produce statistically significant effects, and have not led

32 to consensus on advertising effectiveness (Hu et al. [2007], Lewis and Reiley
33 [2008], Lewis and Rao [2012]).

34 Further, field experiments tend to involve a particular subset of ads: those
35 that a firm is uncertain enough about to agree to conduct an experiment.
36 These ads may be quite different from ads that are *routinely* purchased by
37 firms. By contrast the differential viewership associated with the the Super
38 Bowl and other sports events yields natural experiments that can be used to
39 estimate advertising effectiveness.

40 Two weeks prior to the Super Bowl, the NFC and AFC Championship
41 games are played. Controlling for the point spread, the winners of these
42 games are essentially random. On average, the Super Bowl will be watched
43 by an additional eight percentage points, or roughly 20 percent, more house-
44 holds, in the home cities of the teams that play in the game compared to
45 other cities. There is a similar increase in viewership for the host city of the
46 Super Bowl. We refer to these boosts in viewership as the “home-city” and
47 “host-city” effects respectively.

48 Super Bowl ads are typically sold out several weeks or months before
49 these Championship games, so firms have to decide whether to purchase ads
50 before knowing who will be featured in the Super Bowl. Hence the outcomes
51 of the Championship Games are essentially random shocks to the number
52 of viewers of Super Bowl ads in the home cities of the winning teams. The
53 increased sales of advertised products in cities of qualifying teams, compared
54 to sales in home cities of near-qualifying teams, can thus be attributed to

55 advertisements.

56 There are three attractive features to studying movies advertised in the
57 Super Bowl. First, movie advertisements are common for Super Bowls, with
58 an average of about 7 per game in our sample. Second, different movies
59 advertise each year. Third, Super Bowl ad expenditure represents a large
60 fraction of a movie’s expected revenue. For a Pepsi ad to be profitable, it
61 only needs to move sales by a very small amount. As Lewis and Rao [2012]
62 show, in their Super Bowl Impossibility Theorem, for products like Pepsi,
63 it can be virtually impossible to detect even profitable effects. The cost of
64 Super Bowl ads, on the other hand, can represent a meaningful fraction of a
65 movie’s revenue.

66 There are however, two notable disadvantages to studying movies. First,
67 city-specific, movie sales data are costly to obtain. Nonetheless, we were
68 able to acquire this data for a limited sample of movies and cities. However,
69 we also have an additional proxy for movie demand—Google searches after
70 the Super Bowl. Miao and Ma [2015] and Panaligan and Chen [2013] have
71 illustrated that Google searches are predictive of opening week revenue, and
72 Google searches have the advantage of being available for the full sample of
73 cities.

74 The second disadvantage of studying movies is that movies do not have
75 a standard measure of expected demand *prior* to the broadcast of the Super
76 Bowl ads. Here too Google searches can be helpful in that they can serve as
77 a proxy for pre-existing interest in the movie and help improve the prediction

78 of the outcome (box office or searches) when the movie opens.

79 Wesley Hartmann and Daniel Kapper proposed the idea of using the
80 Super Bowl as a natural experiment at a presentation at the June 7-9, 2012
81 Marketing Science conference. They subsequently circulated a June 2012
82 working paper examining the impact of the Super Bowl ads on beer and soft
83 drink sales. The most recent version of their working paper is Hartmann and
84 Klapper [2015].

85 We independently came up with a similar idea in February of 2013. We
86 focused on Super Bowl movie ads and thought of “fans” as an instrumental
87 variable for ad exposures. Our initial analysis used Google queries for movie
88 titles as the response variable, but eventually we were able to acquire movie
89 revenue data by DMA. Earlier versions of Hartmann and Klapper [2015] and
90 this paper were presented at the same session at the 2014 summer NBER
91 meeting in Cambridge.

92 Both papers find a substantial effect of advertising on purchases in quite
93 different markets. Beer and soft drinks involve substantial repeat purchases
94 and have familiar brands. Movies are typically purchased only once and
95 each is unique. Given these quite different characteristics, it is comforting
96 that both papers find an economically and statistically significant impact of
97 advertising on sales.

98 In a related paper, Ho et al. [2009] build an econometric model of ex-
99 hibitors’ decisions to show a movie, and consumers’ decisions to view a movie
100 during its opening weekend. The first stage equation models the probability

101 of placing a Super Bowl ad for a movie as a function of the movie’s budget,
102 genre, rating, and distributor, whether the movie is released on a holiday
103 week, and the timing of the ad relative to the movies release. Using this
104 estimate, the authors construct expected expenditure on the Super Bowl
105 ad. In the second stage regressions, they use the *predicted* expenditure as
106 an explanatory variable for exhibitor decisions to show the movie, and for
107 consumers’ decisions to view the movies during the opening weekend.

108 Our model differs from the approach in Ho et al. [2009] in that we do not
109 model the studios’ decisions to purchase ads. It is possible (though in our
110 opinion not likely) that astute theater chains recognize that the home cities
111 of the Super Bowl teams will be exposed to more ads and thus be more likely
112 to want to see the advertised movies. If this is so, then our model is about
113 the joint impact of advertising on both consumer and exhibitor decisions.
114 However, in our view the primary response is likely consumer decisions since
115 exhibitors typically have to construct their distribution schedules months in
116 advance. We expand on this point in Section 5.

117 Our work is also related to Yelkur et al. [2004] who analyze the effective-
118 ness of Super Bowl advertising by comparing box office revenue for movies
119 that were advertised on the Super Bowl to a set of popular movies that did
120 not have Super Bowl advertisements. The authors find that, controlling for
121 budget size and release date, movies with Super Bowl advertisements had
122 nearly 40 percent higher gross theatrical revenue than other non-promoted
123 movies. Of course, the movies that were selected to be advertised were likely

124 chosen for some reason, so there could potentially be bias in this estimate
125 due to confounding variables.

126 Overall, with our method we find strong evidence of large effects of ad-
127 vertising on movie demand. Our results suggest that a 100 ratings point
128 increase due to additional Super Bowl ad impressions increases opening week-
129 end movie revenue by 50–70 percent. For the average movie in our sample,
130 this translates into an incremental return of at least \$8.4 million in opening
131 weekend ticket sales associated with a \$3 million Super Bowl advertisement.

132 We believe that researchers can use this methodology for other types of
133 advertising. Sports events such as the World Series, basketball playoffs, col-
134 lege bowls, the Olympics, and the World Cup create many large, essentially
135 random shocks to viewership of ads shown during these events that can serve
136 as natural experiments to measure ad impact.

137 **2 Empirical specification**

We use the following notation.

$$t = \text{date where outcome is measured (opening week)} \quad (1)$$

$$s = \text{date when ads are seen (Super Bowl)} \quad (2)$$

$$y_{mct} = \text{outcome for movie } m \text{ in city } c \text{ at time } t \quad (3)$$

$$x_{cms} = \text{adviews for movie } m \text{ in city } c \text{ at time } s \quad (4)$$

$$z_{cms} = \text{fans of team from city } c \text{ exposed to ad for movie } m \text{ at time } s \quad (5)$$

138 The variable `outcome` is the measure of ad performance, which in the ini-
139 tial specification is Google searches immediately prior to the opening week-
140 end. Later we use opening weekend revenue for a subset of the movies ad-
141 vertised as our ad performance measure.

142 The `advIEWS` are the Nielsen ratings for the relevant Super Bowl. Nielsen
143 ratings correspond to the percent of households watching the Super Bowl in
144 an average half hour.

145 The `fans` variable in the initial specification consists of 3 dummy variables
146 indicating whether the home team of the city in question is the AFC partici-
147 pant in the Super Bowl, whether the home team of the city in question is the
148 NFC participant in the Super Bowl, and whether the city in question hosts
149 the Super Bowl. Later on we investigate some refinements to this measure.

150 Our model specification is then a classic instrumental variable model.¹

$$y_{cmt} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x_{cms} + \epsilon_{cmt} \quad (6)$$

$$x_{cms} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 z_{cms} + \delta_{cms} \quad (7)$$

151 Equation (6) says that the outcome, y_{cmt} , depends on prior ad exposure,
152 x_{cms} . We would not expect that estimating this single equation by ordinary
153 least squares would produce a good estimate of the causal effect of advertis-
154 ing, since x_{cms} could be correlated with ϵ_{cmt} .

¹We also include city and movie fixed effects along with an index of Google searches prior to the Super Bowl as control variables in our regressions.

155 There are a variety of ways that x_{cms} could be correlated with ϵ_{cmt} . For
156 example, suppose that in some years, some cities are particularly interested
157 in entertainment. These cities might watch the Super Bowl more than usual
158 *and* attend movies more than usual. Or suppose different types of movies
159 appealed to different geographic audiences. In this case, the teams that
160 compete in the Super Bowl could affect the choice of movie advertised.

161 Another potential issue is measurement error. The city-level Nielsen rat-
162 ings are based on a relatively small number of households. We would expect
163 measurement error associated with the ratings numbers would attenuate the
164 estimated effect of ad viewership on outcomes toward zero.

165 In order to estimate the causal impact of ad views on outcomes, we need
166 an instrument—a variable that perturbs ad views exogenously.

167 Equation (7) contains such instruments, namely the home-city and the
168 host-city effects we described earlier. We know from prior experience, and
169 will verify in Section 4.1, that this instrument is a strong predictor of ad
170 views. Furthermore, this instrument should be independent of ϵ_{cmt} since
171 advertising expenditures typically are chosen well before it is known which
172 teams will play in the Super Bowl. We present additional arguments for
173 identification in Section 5.

174 **3 Data**

175 **3.1 Ad views**

176 We measured ad views using Nielsen ratings for the 2004-2014 Super Bowls,
177 for 56 designated media markets (cities) from Street & Smith's *Sports Busi-*
178 *ness Daily Global Journal*. Total local ad spend, which we use in Section 5.4,
179 is taken from Kantar Media. This data is only available starting in 2009.

180 **3.2 Movies**

181 We looked at a sample of 70 movies that were advertised in the Super Bowl
182 and were released within 6 months after the game date. The average gap
183 between the Super Bowl and the movie release was about 66 days and the
184 median was 54 days. The gap varied quite a bit, with a standard deviation of
185 about 50 days. Roughly speaking, the median date of release was mid-March,
186 but there is substantial variation in the release date.

187 We obtained the list of movies that advertised for the Super Bowl from
188 the *USA Today's* AdMeter, which lists commercials and viewer ratings for
189 all commercials after every Super Bowl. Release dates, distributor, budget,
190 and national sales by week for every movie were found at the-numbers.com.
191 Data on movie opening weekend sales is from Rentrak.

192 **3.3 Fans and Host City**

193 As indicated above, the simplest proxy for fans of a team in a city is just
194 a dummy variable that equals 1 if the team plays in the home city and 0
195 otherwise. We split the fans into AFC fans and NFC fans. We also add the
196 host city in some specifications. Though the host city is known in advance,
197 we argue in Section 5 that it represents such a small part of the total boost
198 in viewership that it is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on advertiser
199 choices. The advantage of including the host city is we get more power.
200 However, the quantitative results are similar with and without host city,
201 suggesting advertisers do not select ads considering which city is hosting the
202 game.

203 To test the sensitivity of our results to alternate specifications, in Sec-
204 tion 6.1 we refine the definition of fans using Google searches, and in Sec-
205 tion 5.3 we adjusted the fans measure using Vegas odds in the playoffs so as
206 to reflect the estimated fans at the time of the playoffs.

207 **3.4 Searches**

208 Movie titles frequently contain common words, making it difficult to use
209 simple text matching to identify queries related to movies. For example, the
210 word [wolverine] could refer to an animal, a university mascot, a brand of
211 boots, or a Marvel comics character.

212 We address this problem by using the Google entity identifier associated

213 with the movies in our sample. Google’s entity identifier attempts to disam-
214 biguate different uses of a word by using contextual information associated
215 with the search. So if a user searched for other animals in the session where
216 a search for [wolverine] occurred, that user is likely looking for information
217 about the animal. On the other hand, if a user included movie related terms
218 along with a search for [wolverine] it is likely that they were using the word
219 as short-hand for the movie *X-Men Origins: Wolverine*.

220 With the Google entity identifier, we generate a control variable in our
221 regressions based on the Google Trends index prior to the Super Bowl for
222 each city and movie in our data. The Google Trends index for the week
223 preceding the opening weekend was used as an outcome variable in the initial
224 specification. We interpret this index as a measure of “interest” in a movie.
225 The Google Trends data has the advantage of being complete—available for
226 all movies in the sample—and non-proprietary.² By contrast, the Rentrak
227 data on opening weekend revenue is available only for a subset of movies and
228 is proprietary and cannot be freely redistributed.

229 In addition to the Google Trends index of searches on the movie prior to
230 the Super Bowl, we also use city and movie fixed effects.

231 We also confirm that a movie’s opening weekend box office sales can be
232 well-predicted by a few key features. In particular, we regress box office sales
233 per capita on searches prior to the Super Bowl, the type of movie (comedy,

²The number of queries in a given city must be larger than an unspecified privacy threshold to show up in the index, so there are a few smaller cities that report zero searches on movie entities prior to the Super Bowl. We drop these cities from the analysis.




Figure 1: This shows how opening box office sales per capita compare to a prediction using a few features: Google searches prior to the Super Bowl, the type of movie (comedy, adventure, etc.), the distributor, the rating, and the DMA. We use both an ordinary linear regression and a random forest model.

234 adventure, etc.), the distributor, the rating, and the DMA. We use both an
 235 ordinary linear regression and a random forest model. The OLS prediction
 236 has an R^2 of 0.51 and the random forest has an R^2 of 0.87. Figure 3.4 shows
 237 how these two predictions compare to the actual box office sales.

238 4 Results for Google Searches

239 4.1 First stage

240 This section examines the effects of advertising on Google searches in the
 241 week prior to opening weekend. Table 1 shows that the Nielsen ratings in a
 242 given city are strongly related to whether that city is a home city for one of
 243 the teams playing or the host city for the game.

Table 1: First Stage: Super Bowl Ratings and Fans of Teams

	Nielsen Ratings	
	(1)	(2)
City of AFC Championship Game Winner		0.077*** (0.009)
City of NFC Championship Game Winner		0.076*** (0.008)
Super Bowl Host City		0.063*** (0.008)
Constant	0.455*** (0.004)	0.451*** (0.003)
Adjusted R-squared	0.66	0.75
Observations	616	616

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the city-year level are shown in parentheses. City and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Nielsen ratings correspond to the percent of households watching the Super Bowl in an average half hour. Home city is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a team plays in a city; 0 otherwise. The Green Bay Packers' Home city is Milwaukee, since we do not have ratings data on Green Bay. Data sources are discussed in more detail in Section 3.

244 Column (1) of Table 1 shows the R^2 for the regression that only uses
 245 city and movie fixed effects. Column (2) shows what happens to R^2 when




Figure 2: Nationwide searches for movies advertised during the Super Bowl and similar movies that were not advertised during the Super Bowl.

246 we include dummy variables for the teams that are playing and the host
 247 city. The R^2 moves from 66 percent to 75 percent, indicating that these
 248 instruments significantly improve the prediction of Nielsen ratings.

249 As the regression shows, about 8 percentage points more households will
 250 watch the Super Bowl in the home city of qualifying teams. This is about a
 251 20 percent increase in ratings compared to the sample average.

252 4.2 Second stage

253 Figure 2 shows the nationwide queries on movie titles advertised in the Super
 254 Bowl.

255 It is clear that movies advertised in the Super Bowl see a significant bump

256 in searches. We also contrast these searches with national search volume for
257 a set of placebo movies that had similar qualities to the advertising movies
258 but did not advertise in the Super Bowl. We discuss how we select these
259 movies in Section 6.3.

260 While it is clear there is an increase in interest in advertising movies
261 immediately after the ads are shown, it is not apparent how much of that
262 initial interest translates into box office revenue. That question is what our
263 model is designed to answer.

264 The regression results in Table 2 use an ordinary least squares regression
265 in Column (1) to show that, for movies that advertised in the Super Bowl,
266 Google searches on release week are notably higher in cities with higher Super
267 Bowl ratings than in other cities. Note that Google Trends numbers for the
268 search volume in a particular geo are measured relative to the total number
269 of searches in that geo. Hence the Trends numbers are already normalized
270 for population size.

271 Column (2) uses both home and host cities as instruments and finds about
272 twice as large an effect as the OLS estimate. Our baseline model uses host
273 cities as an instrument but Table 5 shows the estimated effect is similar if
274 we use only home cities.

Table 2: Effects of Advertising

	log(Google Searches on Release Week)		log(Box Office PC)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nielsen Ratings	0.314 (0.243)	0.762** (0.318)	0.484** (0.225)	0.771** (0.362)
log(pre Search)	0.068*** (0.018)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.012)
Adj. R-squared	0.89	0.89	0.96	0.96
Observations	3,080	3,080	1,088	1,088
Specification	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the city-year level are shown in parentheses. City and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Super Bowl ratings are Nielsen ratings, corresponding to percent of households watching the Super Bowl in an average half hour. Instruments include dummy variables for the home and host cities. Data sources are discussed in more detail in Section 3.

275 5 Identification

276 In this section we consider arguments questioning the validity of the **fans**
 277 instrument and present rebuttals to these arguments.

278 We note that there could be a potential problem in our estimates above if
 279 East Coast and Midwest football fans liked different kinds of movies. In such
 280 a case, the movie that a studio chooses to advertise could, in principle, depend
 281 on which teams play in the Super Bowl. In our view, this is conceivable, but
 282 not likely.

283 The reason this shouldn't impact our estimates is that the decisions about
 284 which movies to promote and how much to spend on promotion are made at
 285 a *national* level. This means that variations in attendance will be determined

286 primarily by local tastes. The only role that advertiser decisions might make
287 is in determining which movies to advertise nationwide. This will typically
288 not depend on which teams end up playing since the choice of which movies
289 to advertise 1) is made well in advance and 2) has a tiny impact on the total
290 size of the audience, as we establish below.

291 **5.1 Ad decisions are made in advance**

292 The decision to show an ad in the Super Bowl is typically made far in advance
293 of the actual game, when advertisers would have little idea which teams would
294 play. (They would know the host city, which we deal with shortly.) Table 3
295 presents a list of press reports about the status of Super Bowl ad sales.
296 (We report short URLs for reasons of space; complete URLs are provided
297 in a spreadsheet in the Appendix.) Of course most advertisers do not wait
298 until the last minute to purchase ads. According to our discussions with
299 film industry executives, the decision about which movies to advertise in the
300 Super Bowl are decided well in advance of the game. Generally studios only
301 have a few choices of movies that will be released in an appropriate time
302 frame, and a great deal of care goes into planning and executing marketing
303 for the hoped-for blockbusters.

Table 3: Ad sales for Super Bowl.

Year	Snippet	Date	Source
2003	fewer than 10 spots available	Jan 06 2003	superbowl.ads.com
2004	–NA–	–NA–	–NA–
2005	said Thursday all 59 slots had been sold	Feb 02 2005	money.cnn.com
2006	80% sold	Dec 18 2005	www.mediapost.com
2007	first half sold out	Jan 03 2007	money.cnn.com
2008	90% sold out by first week in Nov	Nov 07 2007	money.cnn.com
2009	much was sold out by September	Jan 09 2008	money.cnn.com
2010	had finished selling commercial time	Feb 01 2010	articles.latimes.com
2011	3 months before	Oct 29 2010	adage.com
2012	has sold out	Jan 02 2012	www.bloomberg.com
2013	advertisers need to announce 5 months out	Sep 03 2013	www.usatoday.com

Notes: The columns show the Super Bowl year and extracts from news articles that appeared on the indicated date from the indicated source. The full URL for these snippets is available in the online Appendix.

304 5.2 Home-city and host-city effects are small

305 It may well be that studios would advertise different movies in different ge-
 306 ographies if they were able to do so, but in this case there is a single nation-
 307 wide audience and advertisers must choose one movie for the entire audience.
 308 This restriction makes it implausible that the host cities and home cities of
 309 the teams playing in the Super Bowl would have any impact on advertising
 310 decisions since the *aggregate* audience for the ad is not very sensitive to which
 311 teams actually play and where they play.

312 To see this, we constructed an estimate of what *would have happened* to
 313 viewership if the teams that lost the championship games instead won those
 314 games and competed in the Super Bowl.

315 Consider for example, Pittsburgh’s 2005 loss. This meant that 161,000

316 fewer households watched the ad in Pittsburgh than would have watched had
317 Pittsburgh won. However, compared to the total viewership for the Super
318 Bowl that year of 86 million this is only 0.2 percent, a tiny factor in an
319 advertiser's decision.

320 The largest city in our sample is New York, but even in this case, the
321 impact of the counterfactual is only 1.2 percent. Nationwide the average
322 absolute difference in viewers across all DMAs and years was 0.4 percent of
323 national viewership. Would the choice of ad to be shown in the Super Bowl
324 depend on a 20 percent boost in viewership for 0.4 percent of the population?
325 We believe that this effect is insignificant from an economic viewpoint and
326 unlikely to affect studio decisions.

327 A similar argument applies to the host cities which are known in advance.
328 However, the population of the host cities comprise only 1.6 percent on av-
329 erage of the DMAs in our sample. It seems implausible that choosing which
330 movie ad to show nationwide in the Super Bowl would be influenced by a 0.2
331 percent boost in viewership (1.6 percent of the population times a 15 percent
332 boost).

333 **5.3 Expected fans**

334 Even though advertisers do not know with certainty who will play in the Su-
335 per Bowl game, they can form judgments about who will play. Our contacts
336 in the movie business tell us that decisions on which movies to advertise are
337 made far in advance of the playoffs, and they would be highly unlikely to

338 substitute at the last minute based on which teams were playing due to the
339 major investments they have made in planning, publicity, and production of
340 the movie ad. Furthermore, as we have seen, the effect on viewership of the
341 movie ad is tiny.

342 Nevertheless, let us take this critique seriously and see how plausible it is.
343 Consider the Vegas odds for the AFC and NFC Championship games.³ We
344 converted these odds to probabilities using the method described in Stern
345 [1986] and calculated the expected fans for each city, where the expectation
346 is made using the Vegas odds just prior to the championship game. We
347 then used the expected fans as control variables in the regressions described
348 earlier.

349 We did not use the host city as an instrument since we thought that if
350 advertisers were so sophisticated that they considered expected fans in their
351 decisions, they would certainly take into account the host city in those deci-
352 sions, which would make the host city an invalid instrument. The expected
353 fans specification made no essential difference in the results.

354 Let us summarize the argument. In our baseline specification, the instru-
355 ment is whether a city's team qualified for the Super Bowl. If advertisers
356 were highly sophisticated and picked advertisements based on which teams
357 were performing well up to the point they chose to advertise this could be
358 a biased instrument. By controlling for the probability a team makes it to

³These are available at <http://www.vegasinsider.com/nfl/afc-championship/history/>.

359 the Super Bowl at the time of the Championship games, we ensure that our
360 instrument is “as good as random.”

361 **5.4 Impact of outcome on subsequent ad spend**

362 If advertisers choose their subsequent ad spend on a movie based on the
363 associated Super Bowl ratings, our instrument would not be valid. To check
364 this possibility we ran a regression to see if local ad spend was associated
365 with home and host cities. Our data on local ad spend is from Kantar Media,
366 and these data were only available to us starting in 2009.

367 The results of this regression are shown in Column 2 of Table 4. These
368 estimates should be compared to those in Column 1 which is the first-stage
369 regression from Table 1 but restricted to data from 2009 onward. Both de-
370 pendent variables, the Nielsen ratings and ad spend per capita, are expressed
371 in logs. Hence, the regression coefficients can be interpreted as percentage
372 response. The impact of host and home cities on Nielsen ratings is large and
373 statistically significant while the corresponding coefficients for local ad spend
374 are small and statistically insignificant.

375 **6 Variations on the baseline model**

376 Here we consider a few variations on the baseline model.

Table 4: Local ad spend compared to Nielsen ratings

	<u>log(Nielsen Ratings)</u> (1)	<u>log(Ad Spend PC+1)</u> (2)
City of AFC Championship Game Winner	0.107*** (0.021)	-0.003 (0.008)
City of NFC Championship Game Winner	0.133*** (0.020)	-0.011 (0.008)
Super Bowl Host City	0.093*** (0.020)	0.005 (0.008)
Adjusted R-squared	0.80	0.58
Observations	336	336
Fixed Effects	City and Year	City and Year

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: These regressions include only observations for 2009 onward due to data availability. For each year and city, we add up local television spending across all Super Bowl movies. This gives one observation for each year and city, making the data directly comparable to Nielsen ratings data. There are a small number of zeros in local ad spend for a few small cities and niche movies, which is why we took log of `adspend + 1`. Note that these cities may well have seen some movie ads through *national* advertising campaigns.




Figure 3: Heat map of estimated fan density for New York Giants and San Francisco 49ers using method described in text.

377 6.1 Other definitions of fans

378 In our baseline model we use dummy variables for the home cities of the two
 379 participating teams. However, some major cities do not have an NFL team,
 380 but football fans in those cities may identify with teams from other cities.
 381 We use Google entity search data from Google Trends in each NFL city for
 382 each NFL team to measure the local interest in that team. See Figure 3
 383 which shows the distribution of searches for the New York Giants and the
 384 San Francisco 49ers. The geographic pattern suggests that this is a plausible
 385 measure for the fan distribution. Our results using this definition of fans are
 386 shown in Column (2) of Table 5.

Table 5: Variations on baseline model for opening week searches

	log(Google Searches on Release Week)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nielsen ratings	0.762** (0.318)	0.684** (0.333)	0.687* (0.355)	0.705 (0.620)	0.721** (0.360)
log(Pre search)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.078*** (0.017)
Adj. R^2	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.92
Observations	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080	3,080
Specification	+Host	Trends	−Host	+Vegas	Weighted

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the city-year level are shown in parentheses. City and movie fixed effects are included in all specifications. Nielsen ratings correspond to the percent of households watching the Super Bowl in an average half hour. Column (1) uses home and host cities as instruments, Column (2) uses the Google Trends data to measure fans, Column (3) omits the host variable, Column (4) uses the expected fans measure based on Vegas odds, Column (5) uses the original specification with population weighting. Data sources are discussed in more detail in Section 3.

387 **6.2 Opening weekend box office revenue**

388 As mentioned above, we have two measures of outcome: Google searches on
389 the movie title and opening weekend revenue.

390 The movie sales data we have is only available for a subset of cities. In
391 particular, we only have data for movies that advertised in the Super Bowl
392 and cities that were the home cities for teams that qualified for a Super Bowl
393 or were the runners-up.

394 Despite the smaller sample, there is evidence of a significant positive effect
395 of Super Bowl ratings on movie sales as shown in Table 2, Columns (3) and
396 (4). Note, though, that the effect on ticket sales is smaller than the effect on
397 Google searches. This is true even if we use only the sub-sample of cities for
398 which we have box office data. Table 6 reports regressions using the alternate
399 definition of fans.

400 **6.3 Placebo analysis**

401 It is conceivable that Super Bowl ratings could influence subsequent movie
402 attendance for all movies. We consider this possibility highly implausible,
403 but decided to check it anyway.

404 One could look at city-by-city movie attendance following the Super Bowl,
405 but a better test is to look at movies that were *similar* to those advertised
406 in the Super Bowl. Accordingly, we constructed a placebo set of movies. If
407 watching the Super Bowl is correlated with subsequent overall movie atten-

Table 6: Variations on baseline model for opening week box office

	$\log(\text{Box Office PC})$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nielsen Ratings	0.771** (0.362)	0.705** (0.342)	0.507 (0.352)	1.401*** (0.527)	0.444 (0.283)
$\log(\text{Pre Search})$	0.035*** (0.012)	0.035*** (0.012)	0.035*** (0.012)	0.038*** (0.012)	0.055*** (0.016)
Adj R^2	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97
Observations	1,088	1,088	1,088	1,088	1,088
Specification	+Host	Trends	−Host	+Vegas	Weighted

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the city-year level are shown in parentheses. City and movie fixed effects are included in all specifications. Nielsen ratings correspond to the percent of households watching the Super Bowl in an average half hour. Column (1) uses home and host cities as instruments, Column (2) uses Google Trends data to measure fans, Column (3) omits the host variable, Column (4) uses the expected fans measure based on Vegas odds, Column (5) uses the original specification with population weighting. Data sources are discussed in more detail in Section 3.

408 dance, we would expect to see it affect both those movies that were advertised
409 and similar movies that weren't advertised.

410 Specifically, we used nearest-neighbor matching based on the movie bud-
411 get, movie category (comedy, action, etc.), distributor, critic ratings, and
412 year and month of release. We used the `matchit` R package which is specifi-
413 cally designed for this purpose and described in detail in Ho et al. [2007a,b].
414 We provide lists of the advertised and matched movies in the online appendix.
415 In our view, these two lists appear to be similar.

416 The results are shown in Table 7 for our baseline specification and a few of
417 the variations considered above. What is noteworthy is that the coefficient
418 on `Nielsen ratings` is insignificant for all specifications. Of course, the
419 movies advertised in the Super Bowl were chosen for that distinction and our
420 matching is far from perfect, so this analysis cannot be considered definitive
421 evidence. Nevertheless, it is suggestive.

422 We can test to see whether the estimated coefficient on ad views (Nielsen
423 ratings) is different for the advertised and placebo movies. To do this we
424 combine the two datasets and add an interaction term for Nielsen ratings
425 and the advertised movies. This is denoted by `Nielsen × Super Ad` in
426 Table 8. The interaction effect is significant at the 10 percent level in our
427 baseline specification (Column 2) and at the 5 percent level when we use the
428 Google Trends measure for fans (Column 3).⁴

⁴Another question is whether placebo movies do worse than they would have if the Super Bowl ads had not run. That is, does advertising for Super Bowl movies cause substitution away from placebo movies? The relevant coefficient to test this is the first one in Table 8, `Nielsen Super Bowl Ratings`. Unfortunately, we get different answers

Table 7: Effects of Advertising: Placebo movies

	<u>log(Google Searches on Release Week)</u>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nielsen Ratings	-0.091 (0.374)	-0.373 (0.387)	0.059 (0.444)	0.198 (0.876)
log(Pre-Super Search)	0.083*** (0.019)	0.083*** (0.018)	0.084*** (0.019)	0.084*** (0.019)
Adjusted R-squared	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.87
Observations	2,747	2,747	2,747	2,747
Specification	2SLS	2SLS (Trends fans)	2SLS (-Host)	2SLS (+Vegas)

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Column (1) shows the baseline IV estimates from Table 2 using the placebo data. Columns (2)-(4) illustrate variations on the baseline model that we consider elsewhere in the paper, such as other definition of fans (Section 6.1), excluding the host city as an instrument, and using Vegas odds to compute expected fans (Section 5.3). The notes from Table 2 apply here as well.

Table 8: Placebo and advertised movies

	<u>log(Google Searches on Release Week)</u>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Nielsen Super Bowl Ratings	-0.483** (0.238)	-0.091 (0.374)	-0.373 (0.387)	0.059 (0.444)
Nielsen X Super Ad	0.797*** (0.305)	0.853* (0.448)	1.057** (0.461)	0.628 (0.483)
log(Pre-Super Search)	0.083*** (0.019)	0.083*** (0.019)	0.083*** (0.018)	0.084*** (0.019)
Adjusted R-squared	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
Observations	5,827	5,827	5,827	5,827
Specification	OLS	2SLS	2SLS (Trends fans)	2SLS (-Host)

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: City and movie fixed effects are used in all specifications. See the notes to the previous table for definitions. Coefficients for other specifications are available in the online appendix.

429 **6.4 Interpretation**

430 The results suggest that an increase of 100 ratings points raises weekend
431 ticket sales for a movie advertised on the Super Bowl by at least 50 per-
432 cent. Note that 100 ratings points means a switch from 0 percent of people
433 watching to 100 percent of people watching. In other words, it measures the
434 difference from a hypothetical situation in which everybody watched the ad
435 to a hypothetical situation in which nobody watched the ad.

436 Since the Super Bowl averages about 42 ratings points overall, this implies
437 that a Super Bowl ad increases release-week ticket sales by about 21 percent.
438 In other words, the coefficient suggests there are 21 percent more ticket sales
439 when 42 percent of the country watched the Super Bowl than there would
440 have been if nobody watched the Super Bowl. The average movie in our
441 sample took in \$40 million on the opening weekend. Thus the incremental
442 ticket revenue from the Super Bowl ad were roughly \$8.4 million on average.
443 Since a Super Bowl ad cost is about \$3 million, this means an overall return
444 of 2.8 to 1.

445 According to industry practice, the studio typically pays for the entire
446 marketing costs and receives 40-50 percent of the domestic box office revenue.
447 (The exact numbers are closely guarded secrets, but see Danzig and Hughes
448 [2014] for some estimates.) Hence the return to the studio from the Super
449 Bowl ad is about 1.4 to 1, or a 40 percent ROI. ⁵

depending on the specification. It is usually negative – suggesting there is substitution –
but only statistically significant in one out of four main specifications.

⁵Hartmann and Klapper [2015] estimate a 153 percent ROI for Super Bowl beer ads,

450 We want to emphasize four caveats in interpreting these results.

451 First, this back of the envelope calculation ignores future revenue streams
452 such as ticket sales after the opening weekend and other revenue through
453 home movie purchases, TV licensing, and so on. Some of this additional
454 revenue may be attributable to the Super Bowl ad impressions, though we
455 have no easy way to measure this.

456 However, a causal relationship between increased movie attendance and
457 increased home entertainment sales is consistent with Choi et al. [2015] who
458 use opening-weekend snowstorms as an instrument and find that a 10 percent
459 rise in theatrical attendance causes an 8 percent increase in DVDs/Blu-ray
460 sales when they are released. Cable licensing deals are also directly tied to
461 box office success so that any increase in box office revenue will positively
462 impact revenue from this channel.

463 We also do not know how the incremental revenue is divided among the
464 various parties—how much goes to the studios, producers, writers, stars,
465 and so on. Similarly, we don't know exactly how the costs of the Super Bowl
466 ad are divided among the various parties. However, as indicated above, it
467 appears that studios are the primary decision makers with respect to Super
468 Bowl ads and bear most of the marketing costs.

469 Second, in calculating the return to advertising, we are assuming that the
470 *incremental* viewers of the Super Bowl have the same response to ads as those
471 who would watch the Super Bowl anyway. It is possible that the committed

but caution that this is a likely an overestimate.

472 fans pay more attention to the game and less to ads. Or perhaps they are
473 much more engaged with the entire experience and so pay more attention
474 to ads than the incremental viewers. It is also possible that the incremental
475 fans have substantially different tastes in movies than the fans you would get
476 simply by purchasing more ad slots. We provide some evidence on this in
477 Section 7.

478 Third, we don't know how these results extend to other settings, as the
479 Super Bowl has unique qualities. There are other similar events such as the
480 World Series, basketball playoffs, the Summer and Winter Olympics, and so
481 on. These natural experiments are not quite as clean-cut as the Super Bowl,
482 but are certainly worthy of future study.

483 Fourth, one might ask why the estimated return is so high. First, it
484 is important to understand that our results pertain to returns on movies
485 that the studio has *chosen* to advertise on the Super Bowl. The return on
486 advertising movies with mediocre prospects could be much lower. Second,
487 once the network has set a market-clearing price, we would expect that the
488 marginal ad would earn a normal, risk-adjusted rate of return. However,
489 the *average* ad would typically earn a return higher than the marginal ad.
490 One might then ask "if the return to the movie ad is so high, why don't the
491 studios advertise more movies?" The answer to this question may be that
492 they only have a few movies for which a Super Bowl ad makes economic
493 sense. Movie theaters can only show a limited number of movies at any one
494 time, and the conventional wisdom in the industry is that if two blockbusters

495 are released on the same weekend, the revenues of both movies will suffer.
496 As a result, studios typically try to stagger the release of blockbusters, so at
497 any one time there are only a few movies that would warrant Super Bowl
498 treatment. Whatever the explanation, we typically see only 6-8 movie ads
499 per Super Bowl and this number does not vary much from year to year.

500 Finally, we want to clarify how these results fit with the Super Bowl
501 Impossibility Theorem (Lewis and Rao [2012]). They argue that it is nearly
502 impossible for a firm to test the effects of an individual ad campaign, even if it
503 randomly assigned DMAs during a Super Bowl. How, then, can we find such
504 highly statistically significant results? The answer is that the Super Bowl
505 Impossibility Theorem refers to the question of measuring the effectiveness
506 of a *single* campaign. But here, we study the average effect of 70 campaigns.
507 The noise level is too high to say anything about the effects of a particular
508 advertisement, but the average performance of all movies in our sample can
509 be estimated reasonably precisely.

510 **7 Heterogeneous treatment effects**

511 We have shown that the incremental ad exposures due to the home-team
512 effect have a causal impact on both Google queries and opening weekend
513 revenue. This suggest that increased ad expenditure would also have an
514 incremental impact on these outcomes. However, the incremental ad views
515 from the home-team effect may well be different than the incremental ad

516 views from simply spending more money on advertising.

517 We can offer some suggestive evidence on this point. We ran a Google
518 Consumer Survey and asked the 2,568 respondents whether they watched
519 the Super Bowl on TV in 2013, 2014 or both years. The question of interest
520 was whether those who watched both years were different than those who
521 watched only one year. The dimensions on which the respondents could differ
522 were inferred age, gender, and income.⁶

523 We found that those who watched the Super Bowl in both years, rather
524 than a single year, tended to be older, more male, and live in wealthier areas.
525 However, most of these effects tended to be statistically insignificant, with
526 the exception of gender. We suspect that there is *some* difference between the
527 incremental viewers from the home-city effect and the incremental viewers
528 that would be reached by increased ad spend.

529 Nevertheless, we believe that our estimates can be useful in estimating
530 the response to ad spend. Suppose that a movie advertiser targeted its ads to
531 reflect the audience composition of the *incremental* Super Bowl viewers. This
532 targeting could be informed by a more sophisticated version of our survey.
533 That advertiser might well expect a response to its ad spend along the lines
534 of that described in Section 6.2. So those estimates of the impact of spend
535 on box office should be a *lower bound* on what ad effectiveness would be if
536 ad targeting could be fully optimized.

⁶Inferred age and gender are based on web site visits and inferred income is based on the IP address of the respondent and Census data.

537 We also can test whether there are differential effects based on when a
538 movie is released. Are ads less effective for movies released well after the
539 Super Bowl? We divided our sample into movies with release dates more
540 than 70 days out and those with release dates less than 70 days out. We
541 recreated the regressions in Table 2. Somewhat surprisingly, we did not see
542 a difference in the effects of ads on box office sales in these two groups.⁷

543 8 Discussion

544 We use a natural experiment—the Super Bowl—to study the causal effect
545 of advertising on movie demand. Our identification strategy relies on the
546 fact that Super Bowl ads are purchased before advertisers know which teams
547 will play in the Super Bowl and that cities where there are many fans of the
548 qualifying teams have substantially larger viewership than other cities do.

549 Within this setting we study 70 movies that were advertised during the
550 2004-2014 Super Bowls. We compare product purchase patterns for adver-
551 tised movies in cities with fans from the qualifying teams to cities with fans
552 of near-qualifying teams. We find a substantial increase in opening weekend
553 revenue due to Super Bowl advertisements. On average, the movies in our
554 sample experience an incremental increase of \$8.4 million in opening weekend

⁷In general, we don't have sufficient power to break down the treatment effects. There are several other interesting questions, such as whether there are differential effects for movies with more competition, but we have to leave these questions for further research. It may be possible to investigate such issues after we accumulate a few more years of Super Bowl data.

555 box office revenue from a \$3 million Super Bowl advertisement.

556 We suggest that our methodology can be generalized to a variety of sports
557 settings where the nature of qualifying creates a large random shock to ad
558 viewership in a particular area, and that this methodology has notable ad-
559 vantages compared to the more common approach of using field experiments
560 to determine the causal impact of advertising. The best identification comes
561 from sporting events such as the Super Bowl in which the teams that will play
562 are unknown at the time companies purchase advertising spot. However, even
563 if the home cities are known it seems to us unlikely that advertisers would
564 take this information into account when choosing its ad expenditure. So the
565 methodology could well be applicable for a broader set of media broadcasts
566 with differential appeal across geographies.

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